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	18 August 1980
MEMORANDUM	
SUBJECT: Iran and the US Presidential	Election
Iranian hardlinersespecially Aya	itollah Khomeiniare
determined to exploit the hostage issue President Carter's defeat in the Novemb	er elections. We
expect the Iranians to expose past "IS as well as to emphasize IS inability to	imperialism" in Tran
Tehran wants the world to believe that President Carter's downfall and disgrac	Imam Khomeini caused
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Iranian leaders believe that the U	e the US in general
and the President in particular. Khome that President Carter is not really con	ini has often said
hostages but simply wants to use the is	sue to ensure re-
to be remembered as the man who brought	down the Shah and
the current administration in the US.	
There is no sign that the Iranians if elected, Governor Reagan would adopt	are concerned that,
to the nostage situation or, in fact, t	hat Khomeini caree
who the next President will be. Ayatol mid-July that Tehran does not want to do	eal with President
Carter, Reagan "or any other one" exception the hostages. The Iranians are conf.	t the American people ident that the US
lacks the ability to rescue the hostage President.	s no matter who is
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This memorandum was prepared by	the
Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near Las	st South Asia Division,
Office of Political Analysis. Comments	or averies may he

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## Trials

The hardliners believe that show trials of the hostages offer the best way to humiliate the US. We expect at least some hostages will be tried before 4 November. The Iranians have claimed that they have discovered numerous documents in the Embassy that prove that some Embassy personnel are CIA employees who were in contact with opponents of Khomeini. We expect they will use these and hostages' "confessions" to prove their case against the US to the world.

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We expect the hardliners would dominate the trial procedure since they control the Iranian judicial system. To maximize the impact of the trials the Iranians could:

- -- Invite the press to observe the trials;
- -- Prolong the trials for weeks, perhaps trying each hostage individually;
- -- Invite US citizens to testify about past US activities in Iran such as the 1953 coup and CIA ties to SAVAK;
- -- Appoint notorious Iranian religious leaders like Ayatollah Khalkhali to serve in the jury; and
- -- Invite representatives from various liberation groups like the PLO to testify about US imperialism.

We expect the Iranians will find at least some hostages guilty of espionage and sentence them to long prison terms both to constrain the US from retaliating and to underline US impotence on the hostage issue. Hassan Ayat, a hardline ideologue in the Assembly, said this month that the hostages "must be put on trial, be condemned and serve sentences."

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## Other Activities

The Iranians may also choose to encourage Iranian students in the US to step up their protests to further discredit President Carter during the campaign. While we

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Any word of encouragement from Khomeini almost certainly would spark fresh student outbreaks in the US and other countries. Even without Tehran's encouragement, we expect Iranian students in the US and their Palestinian allies may want to influence the US elections by sparking violent confrontations with US citizens during demonstrations. We do not rule out the possibility as well that Iranian extremists both in the US and in Iran may resort to violence within the US to influence the elections.

Khomeini may also choose to stir up trouble among Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia to pressure the US this fall. Tehran radio has long broadcast inflammatory appeals to the Shia--who are located near the Saudi's major oil facilities--with some success.

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